Daniel Sennert and the Late Aristotelian Controversy over the Natural Origin of Animal Souls

Abstract

While both the Aristotelian and the Galenic traditions took it to be the hallmark of animals that they are beings endowed with sensi­tive souls, in both traditions there were ambiguities concerning the question of whether animal seeds are animate or inanimate. The early moderns were looking for more clear-cut solutions. On the one hand, there was the option to regard animal seeds as actually endowed with souls—a view prominently defended by the Wittenberg-based physi­cian Daniel Sennert (1572–1637). On the other hand, there was the option to regard animal seeds as purely material beings. The latter view was taken by Juan Gallego de la Serna, royal physician to the Spanish kings Philip III and Philip IV. Gallego adopted two notions central to late Aristotelian natural philosophy: the notion of the eduction of forms from the potency of matter, and the theory of matter and form as incomplete entities. This article traces how Sennert developed his own conception of animate seeds through a detailed critique of Gallego and his scholastic predecessors.