Megnevezés és szükségszerűség kétdimenziós szemantikai keretben

Szerzők

  • János Kovács

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2010.10.1.5

Absztrakt

This paper surveys the relevance of Kripke’s semantics of proper names. In his Naming and Necessity Kripke takes issue with Frege’s and Russell’s descriptive semantics of proper names. He proposes a new model called the causal model of proper names. Kripke’s model of the philosophy of language have challenged the relation of the metaphysical concepts necessity/contingency and the epistemological concepts apriority/a posteriority, respectively. Since Kant it has been accepted that all a priori truth is necessary, while all a posteriori truth is contingent. Kripke’s book has changed these tenets and nowadays it is accepted that the four concepts are independent of each other and that the complex concepts generated with them have instance.  

This paper investigates Kripke’s arguments on necessity and apriority in a two-dimensional semantic framework. The paper argues that the two-dimensional model is in harmony with Kripke’s model although Soames has been claiming the opposite in several publications. The paper claims that Soames’ theory of direct reference is unable to account for necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori statements.

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Megjelent

2012-10-22

Hogyan kell idézni

Kovács, J. (2012). Megnevezés és szükségszerűség kétdimenziós szemantikai keretben. KÜLÖNBSÉG (Difference), 10(1). https://doi.org/10.14232/kulonbseg.2010.10.1.5

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